

CINC
Policy & Strategy Book
Volume I

1984

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. This Volume contains an unclassified description of the United States Central Command. It provides background information on: the genesis of the command; a discussion of the threat to the countries in the area; US strategy, policy, objectives and interests in the area; a description of the countries that are located in the area of responsibility (AOR); a discussion of USCENTCOM strategy, mission and tasks in the AOR; a summary of USCENTCOM forces; and a digest of programs affecting the command.

2. The information in this Volume has been extracted from a wide variety of unclassified sources. The material provides a standard data base to be used in the preparation of unclassified correspondence and may be used to support discussions with visiting correspondents, foreign dignitaries, Congressional staffers, etc.

3. Holders of Volume I are cautioned that total reproduction of this Book for distribution outside of USCINOCENT Headquarters is not authorized.

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THE UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND

I. GENESIS

In 1977, the combination of a growing Soviet military projection capability and the political instability in the Third World regions of vital interest to the US posed a significant threat to the national security. A growing awareness of this threat prompted the US to review its readiness to respond to crisis situations and to increase its capability by identifying and preparing rapid deployment forces. Rapid deployment forces were identified to respond to non-NATO contingencies. The requirement for such forces was recognized as a result of strategic appraisals and the Force Posture Study completed in February 1977. On the basis of these studies, the President directed the Department of Defense to maintain deployment forces, in addition to those required for NATO, to meet non-NATO contingencies. The Secretary of Defense, acting on this direction, identified a force structure in the Fiscal Year 81-85 Draft Consolidated Guidance. The force composition was based on the threat analysis of areas around the world in which there were delicate and potentially explosive situations, excluding situations in which there might be major Soviet involvement. The force size identified, therefore, fell far short of what would be required to meet the worst case, half war portion of our one-and-a-half-war strategy.

Thus, the Administration, between February 1977 and February 1979, had determined a requirement for a non-NATO military capability, issued a Presidential directive to initiate Defense action, and provided guidance for the composition of the forces to meet the limited non-NATO contingencies requirement. No forces in addition to those existing were planned or funded. The concept of a force responding rapidly to a contingency anywhere in the world outside NATO with a credible war fighting capability was recognized as requiring integrated planning, training, and a supportive command structure. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, working with the Administration guidance, began to take specific action in this regard in August of 1979.

The JCS began by identifying rapid deployment forces (RDF) and a tentative Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) composition. The forces capable of rapid deployment, RDF, formed the reservoir from which forces could be assigned to the RDJTF for a specific contingency. The identification of the tentative forces for the RDJTF provided the structure for initial RDJTF planning as well as an appropriate force size on which to base other RDJTF plans.

In October 1979, on the recommendation of the JCS, the Secretary of Defense directed the establishment of a joint task force that would respond to worldwide contingencies. The JCS decided that this CONUS based force, retitled RDJTF, would be established as a subordinate element of the US Readiness Command, at MacDill Air Force Base, Fla. The commander of the RDJTF would plan, jointly train, exercise, and be prepared to deploy and employ the forces identified for the RDJTF.

Terms of reference for the RDJTF, command arrangements, additional force assignments, and other plans were worked out in a series of Joint Strategic Planning System documents and separate joint actions. The rapid deployment force concept was described as follows:

1. RDF - A reservoir of forces capable of rapid deployment. When directed by JCS, forces would be assigned to, or operate in support of, the RDJTF during training or deployment/employment.
2. RDJTF Headquarters - A headquarters under USREDCOM responsibility for planning, training, exercising, and for the deployment and employment of forces as directed by the JCS. No forces were assigned except during training exercises or contingency employments/deployments.
3. RDJTF Mission - Rapid response to non-NATO contingencies world-wide.
4. RDJTF Command Arrangements - The RDJTF Headquarters is a subordinate element of USREDCOM. However, it responds directly to regionally assigned unified commands, USREDCOM, or to the national command authority through the JCS for contingencies.

On 24 April 1981, the Secretary of Defense announced that over a period of three to five years, the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) should evolve into a separate unified command -- with its own geographic responsibilities, Service components, forces, intelligence, communications, logistics facilities and other support elements. This plan outlined that the Commander in Chief of the US Readiness Command would remain the superior of the Commander of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force until the RDJTF became a unified command. Relationships among the present unified commands was not changed, and the RDJTF headquarters would continue to be located at MacDill Air Force Base in Florida. The RDJTF would continue to have a potential for world-wide deployment, but its major focus would remain on Southwest Asia. The decision to retain the headquarters of the RDJTF at MacDill was made because of political and cost constraints. The clear preference was to locate the new unified command and a sizable proportion of its forces on land in or somewhere very close to Southwest Asia.

On 1 October 1981, the Secretary of Defense chartered the RDJTF as a separate joint task force reporting directly to the National Command Authority (NCA) through the Joint Chiefs of Staff - rather than through the US Readiness Command. Further, the Commander, RDJTF was now assigned operational planning responsibility for Southwest Asia only. This narrowed scope reflected the recognition of the need for a full-time major commander to develop detailed plans for the wide range of possible contingencies in the region. Although no new combat forces were created for the RDJTF, its commander was given operational control over several Army units and Air Force tactical fighter squadrons. In addition, he was provided access to a reservoir of forces from which he could draw additional units in time of crisis, depending upon the size and nature of the contingency.

Some of the major units available to the RDJTF were:

* - Indicates units under the operational control of Commander, RDJTF.

In addition to the above forces, the Commander, RDJTF was assigned Army, Air Force and Naval Headquarters under his operational control. XVIII Airborne Corps Headquarters at Fort Bragg, North Carolina was designated as Rapid Deployment Army Forces (RDARFOR). 9th Air Force Headquarters at Shaw AFB, South Carolina was designated as Rapid Deployment Air Force Forces (RDAFFOR). The Assistant Chief of Staff for Plans and Policy on the staff of the Commander in Chief, US Pacific Fleet in Honolulu, Hawaii was designated as Rapid Deployment Naval Forces (RDNAVFOR).

The concept of operations for the RDJTF was to structure a force to deter aggression from outside the Southwest Asia/Persian Gulf region and to assist nations in the region in resisting aggression from outside the region. When directed by the NCA, the RDJTF had the capacity to swiftly deploy a force to

the Southwest Asia/Persian Gulf region. The presence of such a force would be intended as a signal to potential adversaries that movement of their armed forces into the area could result in direct confrontation with the US. If deterrence failed, the RDJTF was prepared to conduct sustained combat operations in the region.

In December 1982, JCS completed the actions directed in the 24 April 1981 announcement by the Secretary of Defense, and established the United States Central Command. The new command was established effective 1 January 1983 and Lieutenant General Robert C. Kingston, USA was confirmed as the Commander in Chief.

II. THE THREAT

A. General.

Soviet development of increasingly more capable armed forces has enhanced Moscow's ability to press its challenge to Western interests in nearly every corner of the globe. Indeed, the Soviet drive to build these forces and to press their modernization and growth flows in part from the recognition that powerful armed forces underwrite the USSR's status as a superpower and its ability to satisfy global political objectives. The Soviet long-term goal has remained relatively consistent - to attain pre-eminent influence in world affairs. In pursuit of this goal, the Soviets have vigorously sought to erode the Western alliance system, to promote instability in the Third World, and to accelerate the expansion of communist societies. Soviet techniques to implement this overall strategy have become more numerous and increasingly more flexible, sophisticated, and pragmatic.

The Third World has emerged as a vital area for the execution of Soviet global strategy, because it offers ripe opportunities for expansion with fewer constraints and lower risks of superpower confrontation. The Soviets are adept at exploiting opportunities using coordinated overt and covert means to aggrandize the power of the USSR.

The Soviets view power projection as a dynamic and coordinated application of various means including military force, diplomacy, military advisers and aid, treaties and legal ties, economic aid, and cultural, media, and educational exchanges. Added to these are covert activities by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), the Committee for State Security (KGB) and Main Intelligence Directorate of the Soviet General Staff (GRU), to include direct and indirect support for terrorists and anti-Western or pro-Soviet insurgent groups; the use of what the Soviets call active measures such as disinformation, forgeries, manipulation of the media and mass organizations, the use of foreign communist parties and front organizations and other political influence operations.

B. Sub-Saharan Africa.

Soviet strategy toward Sub-Saharan Africa is motivated by traditional ideological factors as well as pragmatic considerations. The sub-continent is not directly vital to the military defense of the Soviet Union, but it is important for other reasons. First, Western countries are heavily dependent upon African strategic resources. The sea routes around Africa, which carry many strategic resources, including oil, are potentially vulnerable to interdiction. Western Europe receives about 50 percent of its cobalt from the area; the US receives about 60 percent; and Japan, 68 percent. Cobalt is particularly important in the production of jet engines. Similar resource dependencies exist for chromite, industrial diamonds, platinum group metals, and manganese. Second, Sub-Saharan Africa contains nearly half of the countries in the Third World and is thus an important Soviet target for expansion and exploitation.

Current Soviet policy in Africa seeks to eliminate Western influence and Western military access; to increase Soviet influence and military, political, commercial and cultural access; to establish pro-Soviet or anti-Western regimes; and to achieve the ability to disrupt Western and Japanese access to vital sources of strategic raw materials. To attain these objectives, the Soviets rely on both military and political instruments. Moscow cannot compete with the West in providing economic aid. To compensate, the USSR blames Western colonialism for African poverty and claims that it is the West's responsibility to provide economic assistance.

Military sales and assistance programs are the most visible and important means by which Moscow has penetrated Sub-Saharan Africa. The Soviet Union is the dominant arms supplier, trainer of indigenous military personnel and, in combination with Cuba, supplier of military advisers to the region. The Soviets have entered into military aid programs with nearly half the states in Sub-Saharan Africa. Ethiopia, Angola, and Mozambique are the USSR's most important arms clients, with Ethiopia accounting for over 60 percent of the nearly \$6 billion worth of Soviet military sales to the region since 1977.

There is firm evidence of continuing covert Soviet support for insurgent and dissident organizations targeted against South Africa, Zaire, Somalia, Sudan and Chad. This support is coordinated to varying degrees with Cuba, East Germany, Libya and Ethiopia. Active measures in Sub-Saharan Africa also remain a staple of Soviet activities. For example, disinformation campaigns have alleged US government efforts to overthrow the governments of Angola and the Seychelles.

Soviet activities are most directly focused on bolstering the client regimes in Angola, Mozambique and Ethiopia. Continuing military aid to Angola has been supplemented by a \$2 billion economic aid agreement for the period 1982 to 1990, designed to reverse Angolan inclinations to seek closer ties with the West, although it is questionable whether the Soviets will, in fact, provide this full amount. Angola harbors the Marxist-oriented South West African People's Organization (SWAPO), which seeks power in Namibia and provides the USSR with access to military facilities.

The port of Luanda is the primary logistics and maintenance base of the Soviet Navy's West Africa Patrol, which usually numbers five to seven units. The patrol's mission is to maintain a Soviet presence and to provide a contingency show of force. In wartime, however, the force could disrupt the surface lines of communication pending the arrival of a Western counterforce. Surveillance of international shipping in these waters is conducted by Soviet naval reconnaissance Tu-95/BEAR-Ds which periodically deploy to Luanda from the USSR.

Mozambique's ruler, Samora Machel, has sought to maintain his non-aligned credentials and has avoided becoming as closely tied to the Soviets as are the Angolans. However, military successes by the National Resistance of Mozambique (NRM) may eventually force Machel to call for Cuban combat forces and increased Soviet aid. In return, Moscow seeks permanent naval access to port facilities. Mozambique, like Angola, controls ports of access to

southern Africa's strategic minerals and provides a base of operations for the Marxist African National Congress (ANC), which seeks to supplant the government of South Africa. The USSR supports the more radical wing of the ANC and seems interested in frustrating a political settlement through bloodshed.

The Soviet Union has made Ethiopia the militarily dominant country in the Horn of Africa. The pro-Soviet regime of Chairman Mengistu is deeply in debt to Moscow for its military arsenal and roundly praises Soviet activities and policies. Ethiopia serves as a home base for the destabilization of Somalia, Djibouti and the Sudan.

In Ethiopia, the Soviets use the airfield at Asmara, and have exclusive use of the naval facilities they constructed on the Dahlak Archipelago. Soviet Il-38 anti-submarine warfare aircraft are usually deployed to Asmara and fly patrols over the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden and the Arabian Sea. At the Dahlak base, the Soviets have been improving naval support facilities over the past six years. A floating drydock, barracks, helicopter pads, floating piers, and navigational aids have increased the usefulness of the facility, which handled about 87 Soviet naval ship visits in 1982.

In sum, Soviet influence and involvement in Sub-Saharan Africa have increased greatly since 1975, when the Marxist regime in Angola came to power with Cuban and Soviet assistance. Although Moscow has suffered setbacks in the Sudan, Somalia, Guinea and Zimbabwe, regional instability makes Africa a lucrative target for continued Soviet attempts at expansionism.

C. Near East/North Africa

Over the long term, the Soviets aspire to have the prevailing military presence in the region in order to influence the policies of the countries in the area. To achieve their goal, the Soviets are attempting to attain several short-term objectives. The Soviets are anxious to play a leading role in any Middle East peace process in order to tailor events to their liking. Although the Soviets seek to establish diplomatic relations with moderate Arab regimes, they would like to see these regimes replaced with ones more favorable to the Soviet Union. The Soviets also strongly support already established pro-Soviet regimes in the region and strive to gain additional access to port and air facilities.

Since the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, the Soviets have paid close attention to the PLO. As the US influence in the region grew, the Soviet-PLO relationship grew. This culminated in 1981 with full diplomatic status being granted the PLO by the USSR.

Soviet-Syrian relations were buttressed by the October 1980 treaty of friendship and cooperation between the two nations. This treaty was cited by a Soviet spokesman as the basis for the first joint Soviet-Syrian amphibious exercise, held in waters off Syria in July 1981.

Soviet-PLO, as well as Soviet-Syrian relations, were strained by the June

1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon. The Soviets were concerned over their inability to effectively aid their PLO and Syrian clients. In order to recoup their position in Syria, the Soviets have placed advanced air defense equipment, most notably SA-5 surface-to-air missiles, with Soviet technicians in the country. Provision of this equipment is in addition to replacement for Syria's losses in the June 1982 campaign.

The USSR's two major arms clients in North Africa, Libya and Algeria, have accounted for the bulk of Soviet military sales to the Middle East. Both countries also rely upon Soviet advisers to maintain their equipment and train their troops. In July 1981, two Soviet naval combatants entered a Libyan port for the first time since 1970. Soviet naval visits to Libya have since become a regular occurrence.

The USSR's increased military presence in Syria provides it with a valuable weapon in ensuring its place in any Middle East peace negotiation. While relations with the PLO are not as good as before June 1982, that organization still needs Soviet political support, and thus is subject to Soviet influence. Soviet presence in and additional access to facilities in Libya and Syria can restore the USSR's military position on the Mediterranean littoral lost with their 1976 expulsion from Egypt.

D. Southwest Asia and the Indian Ocean.

The Soviet Union views Southwest Asia as a region of great strategic significance. Iran is important because it has oil resources, is adjacent to the USSR, and dominates the Persian Gulf oil chokepoint at the Strait of Hormuz. Iraq is a major source of hard currency for Moscow in return for Soviet military aid. Afghanistan is significant as a potential base for future military actions against Persian Gulf countries and as a base for subversive activities against neighboring Pakistan. North and South Yemen offer control over the Bab el Mandeb Strait and access to the Red Sea/Suez Canal as well as potential strategic and diplomatic leverage on the oil-rich Arabian peninsula. Moscow also sees Southwest Asia as a key link between the USSR and the African continent as well as the Indian Ocean. Moreover, Soviet leaders believe that the area lends itself to the exploitation of Western vulnerabilities, particularly the dependence of NATO members and Japan on its oil.

For these reasons, the Soviet Union is working hard to establish itself as the principal power in the region. The proximity of Soviet military forces gives Moscow unique political leverage in this respect. The presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan, the ground forces and Soviet air regiments in neighboring Soviet Military Districts, and the Soviet naval forces operating in the Indian Ocean are a vivid reminder of Soviet capability to act militarily in Southwest Asia and the need for countries in that region to keep Soviet objectives in mind.

Arms sales provide the rationale for the dispatch of Soviet military personnel to Southwest Asia. Soviets serve as instructors, advisers, and technicians who conduct military training, monitor the arms supply and

inventory system, and help with the delivery, assembly and maintenance of equipment. Excluding Afghanistan, there are currently some 2,500 Soviet advisory personnel working in Southwest Asia, with most of these in South Yemen and Iraq.

As another means of fostering ties to the region, the Soviets extend economic aid, to include the sending of thousands of technicians as well as training in the USSR itself. Projects normally are concentrated on basic infrastructure development such as dams, powerplants, steel mills and oil production. Between 1977 and 1981, approximately \$1.5 billion in economic aid was extended. Over 16,000 Soviet technicians are working on various industrial projects in Southwest Asia.

The USSR also promotes ties between "progressive" pro-Soviet states in the region. In early 1981, the Soviets helped lay the groundwork for a political/economic/military alliance among three Soviet client states. The effort culminated in the formation of the Tripartite Agreement signed by Ethiopia, Libya, and South Yemen on 19 August 1981, which provided for coordinated military activities and other efforts against pro-Western countries in Southwest Asia and the Middle East.

South Yemen, which brokered the Tripartite Agreement, is a major Soviet arms client and supporter of Soviet policies in Southwest Asia. Since 1967, Aden has signed close to \$1 billion in arms agreements with Moscow, and for the past six years the USSR and its Eastern European allies have been South Yemen's sole source of weapons. Approximately 2,000 Soviet military personnel are in country. Soviet influence and control in South Yemen are more pervasive than in any other nation in the region, and Moscow enjoys ready access to Aden's air and naval facilities.

E. Soviet Force Presence.

In April 1978, a successful communist coup toppled the independent government of Afghanistan. A second coup in September 1979 resulted in a less pro-Soviet regime. In December 1979, the Soviets invaded and installed a puppet communist regime in Afghanistan. The Soviets now find themselves embroiled in a counter-insurgency campaign that cannot be won with current force levels and tactics. Moscow is unable to control the Afghan countryside or to install a regime whose influence extends more than a few miles from major population centers. However, current Soviet levels of commitment and combat losses probably are acceptable to Moscow, at least for the near-term. The Soviets control the major cities and are working to win through the attrition of the Afghan Freedom Fighters, the Mujahideen, and by indoctrinating a new generation of Afghans to accept life under a communist regime.

The Soviet 40th Army in Afghanistan currently has more than 105,000 troops - an increase of about 25,000 - 30,000 since the 1979 invasion. The increase is due primarily to augmentation by separate security units, including Ministry of Interior (MVD) and State Security (KGB) troops, which assumed protection and security missions, thus releasing combat units from those

functions.

New or modified equipment has been introduced into Afghanistan by the Soviets. The subsonic close air support FROGFOOT aircraft, roughly similar to the US A-10, provides timely and accurate support with bombs, rockets, napalm and cannon fire. The AGS-17 automatic grenade launcher and the 82-mm automatic mortar provide the high trajectory firepower suited for the terrain. Although the Soviets continue to use an older generation of tanks, the latest models of wheeled and tracked armored personnel carriers and self-propelled artillery have found service in Afghanistan.

The Soviets continue to improve and expand their logistic infrastructure in Afghanistan, thus providing further evidence that they intend to remain for a long time. Airfields are being expanded and supplies stockpiled. Rail lines and POL storage sites at transshipment points near the Soviet-Afghan border are being expanded. With an improved and more efficient sustainability base, the Soviets could increase the number of combatants that are now currently employed, or use Afghanistan as a staging area for intervention in other Southwest Asian nations.

Afghanistan provides a live-fire test bed for Soviet weapons, equipment and doctrine. It further provides the Soviet Army with a pool of battle-tested officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers. The Soviets will continue to maintain their presence in Afghanistan to keep the Afghan regime under Soviet control. They will use Afghanistan to extend their own zone of security, as a potential staging area for power projection to South and Southwest Asia and to intimidate the regional states. By Soviet standards the war in Afghanistan is relatively cheap - in money, men and equipment. Since December 1979, only 5,000 Soviets are believed to have been killed and some 10,000 wounded, but the number of Afghan dead and wounded is far greater.

Aside from Afghanistan, Soviet forces for operations in the Southern Theater of war are deployed in the southern Military Districts of the USSR. Twenty-nine divisions, more than 800 tactical aircraft, and some 400 helicopters are available to strike Iran, Pakistan, or Iraq and could continue southward into other Gulf states. Such an effort would be supported by the Caspian Sea Flotilla, the Soviet Indian Ocean Squadron, and a full range of air capabilities including heavy-lift air transport.

Although most of the divisions in the North Caucasus, Transcaucasus, and Turkestan Military Districts (excluding forces in Afghanistan) are at relatively low readiness levels, adequate forces could be generated for offensive operations in several weeks. Units are receiving more modern tanks, armored personnel carriers and other replacements for outdated equipment.

More significant improvements have been made in Soviet air power in the region. Several air defense regiments equipped with older aircraft have been replaced by ground-attack regiments, and airfields have been modified accordingly. The deep-strike interdiction FENCER also is deployed in the southern USSR and could attack targets in Iran, Pakistan, and the Gulf oil-producing states from home base. The range of other tactical aircraft also

can be extended by using airfields in Afghanistan.

F. Summary.

At the end of World War II, there was little United States military focus on Southwest Asia, the Persian Gulf and the Horn of Africa. This stemmed from the fact that the United Kingdom was capably representing Western interests in the area and significant British forces were present.

After the withdrawal of the United Kingdom's forces from east of Suez in the late 1960's and early 1970's, American involvement and attention to the region grew more rapidly. US influence began to increase, particularly in Iran.

Late in 1979, however, two events fundamentally changed the balance of power in this region: the Iranian revolution and the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan. As the decade of the 1970's drew to a close, it was clear that the stabilizing influence of Iran had disappeared with the revolution. It was also clear that there was no counter-balancing military force in the area to assist in maintaining regional stability and safeguarding free world interests. Moreover the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan provided tangible evidence that the Soviet Union would not hesitate to use military force in the region if doing so contributed to longstanding Soviet ambitions and if there was no serious potential for effective opposition.

Historically, the Soviet Union has demonstrated a serious desire to expand into the region. Russia, for example, has invaded Persian territory five times during the past 300 years - and twice in this century alone.

The fact that Soviet military forces continue to occupy Afghanistan in considerable strength makes the Soviet Union a formidable force in the area. There is no military force in the region or in proximity to the region with more combat power.

III. US STRATEGY, POLICY, OBJECTIVES AND INTERESTS

A. Assessment.

There are many important foreign policy and military problems that are not the result of Soviet initiative. Nonetheless, it is the total Soviet military effort, both its magnitude and nature, that largely shapes our defense planning. In planning our military forces and defense strategy, the threat, present and potential, must be the dominant consideration.

The first requirement for our defense policy, therefore, is a clear recognition that we face an adversary with serious long-term goals incompatible with our own and that we must undertake a sustained effort to increase the ability of the United States and our Allies to protect our common interests and to deter the use of force.

The United States remains committed to the defensive use of military power, that is to say, the objective is to deter aggression, not to initiate warfare. Hence, our military forces must be prepared to react under ambiguous warning or after the enemy has seized the first initiative -- a requirement that puts a heavy burden on our readiness, intelligence and command and control capabilities. /

The Soviet capability to project power at great distances and strengthening of outposts under partial or total Soviet military control have created widely divergent threats to US national interest. These Soviet efforts increase their potential for coercion and exploitation of indigenous tension and conflicts in the Third World. Our defense, and the forces needed to carry it out, must be flexible and innovative enough to counter these efforts.

B. US Defense Strategy.

Our strategy consists of a series of discrete, but inter-related elements, some of which have endured for many years, others of which are more recent in origin. It incorporates three main principles:

- First, our strategy is defensive. It excludes the possibility that the US would initiate a war or launch a pre-emptive strike against the forces or territories of other nations.
- Second, our strategy is to deter war. The deterrent nature of our strategy is closely related to our defensive stance. We maintain a nuclear and conventional force posture designed to convince any potential adversary that the cost of aggression would be too high to justify an attack.
- Third, should deterrence fail, our strategy is to restore peace on favorable terms. In responding to an enemy attacks, we must defeat the attack and achieve our national objectives while limiting -- to the extent possible and practicable -- the scope of the conflict. We

would seek to deny the enemy his political and military goals and to counter attack with sufficient strength to terminate hostilities at the lowest possible level of damage to the US, its Allies and friends.

The defensive orientation of our strategy imposes several requirements on our military posture: our forces must be maintained in a high state of readiness; our command, control, communications, and intelligence capabilities must be flexible and enduring so as to improve our warning and response to an attack; and our reserve forces must have the capability to mobilize rapidly.

The commitment to deterrence and defense is neither easy nor inexpensive. When it confronts an opposing coercive "offensive" strategy, it requires continued vigilance to maintain. When deterrence succeeds, it is easy to attribute the maintenance of peace not to the contribution of the defense that enforces the deterrent, but to a host of more facile assumptions -- some imagined new-found "peaceful intent" of the opponent, the spirit of detente, growing economic inter-dependency, and so forth. When deterrence fails, however, and the opponent has deliberately weighed the risks and still decides to attack, the dividends of a viable warfighting defense are unquestionable. But unless such a defense is in being, and is maintained at the ready, it is too late to try to regain it after a war starts.

For deterrence to be effective, several things are necessary:

- First, our forces must demonstrate that they could survive a first strike with sufficient strength to threaten losses that would outweigh any gains a potential adversary might expect from an attack.
- Second, our threatened response to the attack must be credible, that is, of such a nature that the potential aggressor believes we would carry it out.
- Third, the boundary between peace and aggression must be sharp and clear. Formal treaties or agreements serve an important function of clearly defining those limits.

Should deterrence fail, we must be able to halt the attack and to restore the peace. In employing military force to restore the peace, we seek to limit the scope, duration, and intensity of the conflict.

In seeking to limit the scope of the conflict, our objective would be to deny enemy war aims in the theater in which the attack occurred. However, we must recognize that the Soviet Union has enough active forces and reserves to conduct simultaneous campaigns in more than one theater. As a result, we must understand that war could spread to other regions. Access to overseas combat theaters will be a critical factor in denying enemy war aims.

Also, we must recognize that, in a conventional war in a region like Southwest Asia, the geographic limits of combat cannot be taken for granted. For example, the requirements for maritime access to that region may well require us to respond to naval attacks not necessarily limited to the

geographical boundaries of that theater.

We seek to limit the duration of conflict. However, given the Soviet Union's increased ability to sustain a prolonged war, we would be imprudent to prejudge the duration of such a US-Soviet conflict. Preparing only for a "short war" would not only weaken the credibility of our deterrent, it would also be imprudent because if would limit the ability of US military forces to restore the peace should deterrence fail.

C. Defense Policy

It is the overall objective of the Defense Department to contribute to the attainment of our strategy by preventing war, particularly nuclear war. But it is the mission of the Defense Department to prepare to wage war, if necessary. The conduct of war must, under all circumstances, serve political objectives and be clearly guided by a plan for terminating the war in a manner that achieves these objectives.

The indispensable components of the global military posture the US seeks to maintain are: strategic nuclear capabilities to maintain deterrence of nuclear attack under all circumstances and to carry out nuclear attack options consistent with national strategy, should deterrence fail; maritime strength to keep essential sea lines of communications open; air superiority in the key combat areas; continued deployments in NATO Europe and the Western Pacific; rapidly projectable central reserves; a responsive industrial and mobilization base; exploitation of superior technology for military use, and a population fully committed to our military strategy and posture.

To avoid being presented with an unacceptable fait accompli, the US must be able to project forces rapidly and sustain them long enough to develop a full response to Soviet attacks. The structure, mobility, doctrine, training, and readiness of our armed forces must be such that they can: exploit strategic warning, if available; provide the NCA a range of viable options; react in a timely and prudent fashion to tactical warning; and conduct counter-offensives, where appropriate, to take advantage of the enemy's weaknesses.

IV. THE USCENCOM AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY

A. General.

USCINCENT's assigned area of responsibility (AOR) includes all states on the Arabian Peninsula south of the northern borders of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait; the countries of Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan on the Middle East landmass; Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Somalia, and Kenya on the Horn of Africa; and the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf.

This assigned area is larger than the continental United States. The distances involved present considerable obstacles to inter and intra-theater movement and communications. The north-south dimension of this area compares with the distance between Tehran and London. The air line of communication from our east coast to the Persian Gulf area is at least 7,000 miles - a fourteen hour trip on an air-refueled, non-stop C-5 aircraft. The sea line of communication around the Cape of Good Hope is 12,000 miles, almost half the circumference of the earth.

The region is characterized by isolated surface lines of communication and limited transportation terminals for air and sea movements. The road networks, and in some areas, railroads, have replaced the traditional camel as the dominant surface mode of transportation. Nonetheless, the entire area has just two-thirds of the paved road mileage found in the state of Florida.

The terrain of the area is diverse. The majestic mountains of Iran are contrasted by the arid plains of the Horn of Africa. The lush Nile river valley with its dense population and urban centers, is vastly different from the uninhabited empty quarter of the Arabian Peninsula. Climatic extremes range from intense cold in the region's mountains to plus 130 degrees on the desert floor.

The cultures of the Nile and the Tigris and Euphrates Valleys go back over fifty centuries and several of the world's major religions began here. It has been a center of both power and learning and a strategic passage for commerce and conquerors. Modern western civilization owes many debts to its scientific, philosophical and artistic accomplishments.

Today, this region represents all stages of economic and social development. It is marked by great ethnic, religious and political diversity, reflecting a rich history and producing some of the tensions which have resulted in armed conflicts.

Subsequent paragraphs will provide a generalized description of the AOR. However, because of the dynamics of some of the individual countries, these generalizations may not always be completely accurate for a specific nation. Detailed description of each of the countries can be found in the inclosed annexes.

Historical Perspective.

The region has been called both the Cradle and the Crossroads of Civilization, and its significance to the world has fluctuated throughout history. It has been a center of power and learning, a backwater, a strategic passage - playing each role many times. It has known immigrants and conquerors, from both east and west, and the traces of its civilizations go back some fifty centuries. Here Neolithic Man learned to cultivate crops and domesticate certain animals, thus enabling him to cease his continual wandering in search of food. Where he found permanent sources of water he began to build permanent dwellings. Water sources were limited, however, and the two patterns of life that evolved have persisted to the present: those of the settled farmer and the nomadic herdsman.

Some time before 3000 B.C., Middle Eastern Man had learned to work with copper and to write. He had also developed towns, trade, government beyond the village, and a society consisting of a small ruling class and a large peasantry. Great early civilizations rose along the valleys of Tigris-Euphrates and Nile rivers.

The Fertile Crescent, the great arc of semi-arid grassland extending from what is now Israel to the head of the Persian Gulf, provided a way around the desert - a route of trade, migration, and invasion from the earliest times. When Abraham followed the Fertile Crescent from Iraq to Israel some sixteen centuries before Christ, he passed the remnants of civilizations that had risen, fallen, and been forgotten. Marco Polo traveled the Crescent on his journey to China, and noted in the 13th Century A.D. an item that would be a focus of world attention in the 20th Century, "...a fountain from which oil springs in great abundance. This oil is not good to use with food but 'tis good to burn...".

The Suez Canal, completed in 1869, provided such easy access to the East that it eliminated the Fertile Crescent as a significant transportation route. The canal became part of the "lifeline" of the British Empire and a critical element in all geostrategic and economic appraisals of the area. Its closure in 1956 and again in 1967 damaged the economies of the user countries in the area.

Judaism, Christianity, and Islam have their roots in the Middle East. Judaism was briefly ascendent in what is now Israel and the Crusaders ruled there during the 12th century. But since Islam burst from Arabia in the 7th century, most of the people of the Middle East have been Muslim.

In many ways, the Middle East retains features that were established by the Muslims in the 7th century. In addition to the varieties of Islamic and other religious denominations, this region is also characterized by great cultural diversity and linguistic complexity. Culturally, the countries in the area range from the Bedouin tribes of northern Arabia to the Muslim Ibadis of Oman. Many other ethnic groups are represented in the region, and are widely dispersed throughout the area. Linguistically, the area is equally diverse, with the world's four major language stocks represented: Semitic (including Arabic), Hamitic, Indo-European, and Ural-Altaic.

Some changes in the character of the Middle East began to take place early in the 19th century, when European powers began to colonize parts of North Africa, Southern Arabia, and the Persian Gulf. France and Great Britain were the primary colonial powers in the area. The six-century old Ottoman Empire of the Turks was dismantled at the end of World War I, and Iran was united under a dynasty at the same time. Between the wars, national and parliamentary institutions were arbitrarily imposed through the area. This led to the rise of nationalistic movements, and many rebellions and other disturbances took place between 1925 and 1930. During World War II, the area was a battleground for the major belligerents and continued to be occupied by colonial powers.

The war had significant long-term effects on the region. Within a decade after its end, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and Jordan had achieved independence. During the same period Israel was established, a long revolution began in Algeria, and Morocco, Tunisia, Libya and Egypt became sovereign nations. Economically, the area continued to be controlled by foreign economic enterprises, which used the area as a market for manufactured goods and as a source of petroleum, fruit, and some minerals.

American involvement in the region, which had begun as a military necessity during World War II, continued after the war, though on a smaller scale. Once the Axis powers had been defeated, the United States maintained no significant military presence in the region, but the area became increasingly important after the war as an economic force.

Today, the region is an important market for American products and technology. The need to recycle Western petrodollars has also made the oil-rich countries of the region significant players in the international financial community.

C. Cultural Contrasts.

The cultural landscape is one of landless peasants and world travellers, illiterates and intellectuals, poverty and prosperity. Teeming cities support dozens of life styles, individual yet dependent upon one another, and often more closely related to foreign ports than to the neighboring countryside. Rural areas, too, have a variety of cultural forms. In a few square miles at the head of the Persian Gulf, for instance, a number of very specialized life styles appear. The Arab in the marshes that line the lower Tigris and Euphrates Rivers lives on rice, fish, fowl, and buffalo's milk; his shelter and canoe are made of reeds. A few miles distant the Bedouin survives largely on bread, coffee, and camel's milk as he drives his flocks across the desert in search of pasture and drinking water. In the nearby port of Al Basrah, Arabs live in an urban setting replete with consumer goods from around the world. Not far away the alien oil worker lives in an air-conditioned suburb in a style strikingly different from that of the man who raises his family in a reed shelter, a goat's-hair tent, or a mud hut.

Many rural people spend their entire lives in the traditional atmosphere of villages near the place where they were born. The fear of the unknown, the security of the family, and the difficulty of travelling long distances

combine to make the city appear relatively unattractive. However, for increasing numbers of people this is no longer the case. Radio and television are bringing the outside world into the village. The bus and truck, and in some cases the airplane, also carry "Western" ways to the countryside and open the door for travel to the city. The new arrival finds opportunities for unskilled employment are greater in the city than in the village; friends and relatives join him. Once established in the urban environment with people he knows close by, he will probably never again live in the village.

Ethnic and religious differences are responsible for many contrasts in life styles. The Semite whose ancestors came out of the Arabian desert and the Persian who traces his past to Indo-European stock, have languages and customs that are mutually distinctive. Some minority groups, such as the Kurds who dominate remote sections of Iran and Iraq, stand alone in language and custom and have little feeling for national loyalty. On the other hand, some religious groups - Sunni and Shia Muslims, Sephardic and Askenazi Jews, and Christians of various sects - maintain their own communities and are distinguished by dress and custom but participate actively in the economic and political life of their country. Although the isolation of culture, custom, and language in the old sense is breaking down, the ethnic and religious melting pot has yet to appear in the area.

D. Religion.

The three great monotheistic religions that arose in the Middle East have the same God and, essentially, the same rules of conduct. Their concepts of good and evil are the same. Their codes of law are rooted in the Ten Commandments; thus Jews, Christians, and Muslims, following their respective codes, live remarkably similar lives. Judaism is basic to both Christianity and Islam; Christians consider their faith to be the fulfillment of Jewish prophecy; and Muslims feel that their faith embraces the ultimate truth towards which its two predecessors had been striving. In many respects, especially in their austerity and in the intensity of their monotheism, Islam and Judaism are closer to each other than either is to Christianity. But in one respect, Judaism stands alone: Christians and Muslims have actively - and sometimes aggressively - sought converts since their beginnings, but Jews have not. Although it is possible for a non-Jew to convert to Judaism, it is not encouraged, and to be an Orthodox Jew one must be born to a Jewish mother. These rules of membership have resulted in worshippers of the same God numbering, at present throughout the world, some 900 million Christians, 500 million Muslims, and fewer than 14 million Jews.

From the 7th century, Islam has dominated the Middle Eastern religious scene. The crusaders brought back Christian rule to a limited area of the Levant for nearly 200 years in the 12th and 13th centuries and western Jews, the Askenazim, "returned" to carve Israel out of Palestine in the mid 20th. But Israel remains a political/religious enclave in a Muslim world. Many Jews have left the Muslim lands for Israel since it was established but there are still Jewish communities in 19 Muslim countries.

Like Christianity and, to a lesser extent, Judaism, Islam is divided.

Schisms have led to the rise of more than 70 sects, each with its distinctive beliefs. The Sunnis, the largest sect, believe that Muhammad's true successor was the first caliph elected after his death. The Shias consider the office hereditary in the descendants of Muhammad's daughter Fatima and his son-in-law Ali. There is considerable bitterness between these two sects but it has never been as overwhelming - or as bloody - as the rivalry between the major sects of Christendom.

There are many holy places and some are jealously guarded. Non-Muslims are not permitted to enter Mecca or Medina and the Shias have shrines in Iraq and Iran, from which all but Shias are excluded. Jerusalem is unique - holy to Jew, Christian, and Muslim, all of whom have conflicting and apparently irreconcilable claims.

E. Water.

The limits of population and development in the area will ultimately be determined by the availability of water. Demands imposed by increasing population, urbanization, and industrialization have already seriously lowered the water table in some areas. Wells that had provided sweet water since the days of Abraham have dried up or become salty because of excessive pumping, and many qanats, the ancient underground aqueducts, are no longer usable because of the lowered water table. Throughout the region there is generally more arable land than there is water to irrigate it.

Rainfall, groundwater, and streams supply almost all of the fresh water. A few countries, primarily Kuwait, Qatar and Saudi Arabia get some by desalting seawater, but this method, while important, especially to Kuwait, is prohibitively expensive for irrigation. In most of the area, rainfall is too sparse and undependable to support widespread intensive agriculture. Groundwater resources are scattered, but in many regions are the only source of water and have supported oasis settlements for thousands of years. Modern well-drilling and pumping techniques enable man to tap sources never before used, but groundwater is not an inexhaustible resource. In some areas, especially in North Africa, the sources of groundwater are deposits remaining from the Ice Age. Although such reservoirs may be enormous, they are not being replenished; the water they contain, like petroleum, is a nonrenewable resource, and ultimately a more precious one. Groundwater in replenishable aquifers may originate in highland areas hundreds of miles away, as in Saudi Arabia, North Africa, and Iran. These aquifers are not inexhaustible; it may take a century or more for the water to seep through the aquifer from its source to where it is used - once pumped dry the aquifer may remain dry for generations.

Rivers offer the only sources of water large enough for major irrigation projects and land reclamation. Large dams have been built on the major rivers and there are plans to build more. There is considerable room for expansion of irrigation in Iran and Iraq, but Egypt is running out of land suitable for reclamation.

The demand for water in the area will grow - as will the attendant evils of water pollution and misuse. How the countries manage their water resources

will be a prime factor in their development and, possibly, in their survival.

F. Environment.

The countries of the area face a number of the same environmental problems that plague industrial nations - raw sewage, oil spills, and air pollution from factories and refineries. The concerns, however, are not exclusively industrial. Water for domestic and agricultural uses is drastically lowering the water table; urban and rural land is misused; litter and garbage taint city and village alike. Perhaps the most pressing problem is widespread lack of understanding of the implications of man's impact upon the land. There is a popular belief that climatic changes have reduced once-productive areas to desert waste. Some fluctuations in rainfall occur, but for many centuries the climate of the area has been essentially stable. Changes in the physical landscape have resulted from the destructive practices of man. Barren slopes and long abandoned settlements are silent testimony to man's abuse of the land over thousands of years.

Mismanagement has destroyed magnificent forests and indiscriminate grazing of excessive numbers of sheep and goats prevents the regrowth of grasses and trees. Cultivation of marginal areas creates conditions that permit soil to be carried away by wind and water. Over-irrigation and improper drainage have resulted in soil salinization. Wells have long been dug haphazardly and are now drilled to tap aquifers deep in the earth. The concept of water as a national resource is now officially accepted in most countries, but the man in the field has yet to appreciate the fragile nature of a future water supply.

Not all of man's activities are destructive to be sure. Carefully engineered agricultural practices, such as those employed in Egypt, integrate irrigation, drainage, improved varieties of crops, fertilizers, and pesticides to increase the quantity and quality of agricultural production. Even so, the long-term influences of some of these practices is now debated. Is it advisable to spray dieldrin on the dreaded desert locust, to use DDT on crop pests and mosquitos, or to put heavy applications of mineral fertilizers on irrigated land? What new problems will be generated by man's efforts to increase production and to overcome mistakes of the past? No one yet has answers for these questions, but protection and responsible development of natural resources is a major task in the years to come.

G. The Straits.

The seas and gulfs which intrude deeply into the landmass in the area have been routes of trade and transport since earliest times, and control over the narrow straits that connect them with each other and with the oceans has been a matter of international concern - and sometimes controversy - for nearly as long.

After its completion in 1869, the Suez Canal provided the most convenient and rapid water route between Europe and the East. It is the latest of a number of canals in the region constructed or reconstructed during Pharaonic,

Greek, Persian and Arabic times. The earlier canals merely connected the Nile with the Red Sea; the Suez is the first to cut the entire isthmus and connect the Red Sea directly to the Mediterranean. British influence in the Middle East and her occupation of Egypt stemmed in great part from her interest in the canal as a route to India. Since 1956, when Egypt nationalized the canal and banned Israeli shipping, the canal has been a factor in the Arab-Israeli conflict; it was blocked and closed during the French-British-Israeli attack of 1956 and again in the 1967 War.

Bab el Mandeb, at the southern end of the Red Sea, joins the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean. The strait is divided into two passages by Perim Island - Large Strait, about 9 miles wide, and Small Strait, about 2 miles wide. All shipping passes through Large Strait about two miles off Perim Island.

The Strait of Hormuz, which connects the Persian Gulf with the Indian Ocean, has been an important trade route from the days of antiquity. However, at no time in history has it had greater strategic or commercial significance than it has today. The 170-mile strait averages about 50 miles in width from Ra's Dabbah, Oman, around the tip of the Musandam Peninsula and broadens to about 80 miles at the Tunbs Islands in the Persian Gulf. The Strait is deep throughout; depths exceed 20 fathoms within 2 miles off the Omani coast and 7 to 10 miles off the Iranian coast and offshore islands. Normal shipping lanes pass between Little Quoin Island and Musandam Peninsula, where the depths are generally over 50 fathoms. An average of 60 ships pass through the Strait of Hormuz each day. Most of this traffic is petroleum tankers carrying over 50 percent of the world's oil requirements. The Strait of Hormuz, like Bab el Mandeb, is a chokepoint at which shipping from the Persian Gulf could conceivably be cut off at any time. Hormuz, however, is not as vulnerable as Bab el Mandeb; it is too deep and wide to be blocked by sunken ships and too wide to be effectively controlled by coast artillery. Naval and air power would be required to close the strait, a serious step since it is considered international waters by the world community.

B. Conflict Trends.

Throughout the region there are many examples of long disputed boundaries and continued turmoil caused by differences of political ideology. The Iran-Iraq war is based both on ideology and a boundary dispute involving control of the Shatt-Al-Arab waterway. The conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia revolves around claims to the Ogaden region.

The ethnic root of conflict is due, more often than not, to the groups' allegiances and loyalties to their own people and not to the host country in which they live. Many of these groups are seeking autonomy and this leads to rebellion and civil wars. Examples are the Eritrean insurgency in northeast Iraq; and the Baluchis of the tri-border region of Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Superimposed upon the first two roots of conflict are many religious demarcations. The area is primarily Islamic; however, within Islam there are

several sects and subjects, each with its own practices and somewhat divergent beliefs. A primary example is the conflict between the Sunnis and Shiite Muslims, the two largest Islamic sects. Iran, primarily Shia, has been trying to export its militant, radical fundamentalist revolution to other states in the region.

The last root of conflict concerns the natural resource disparities that exist in the region. This has created a severe "have" and "have not" situation. An example is Ethiopia, a country of approximately 32 million people. With few developed natural resources, it has a GNP per capita income of \$400 a year. On the other hand, oil and natural gas rich, Qatar, one of the smallest countries in the region with a population of 225,000 people, has a GNP per capita income of over \$20,000 per year. This type of economic disparity can and has created a breeding ground for intra-regional unrest and dissatisfaction.

The December 1979 invasion of Afghanistan demonstrated an increased Soviet aggressiveness with regard to the region. The current situation in Afghanistan equates roughly to a military stand-off. The Soviet-Afghan forces control the population centers, while the insurgents control most of the countryside, and can intercept lines of communication virtually at will. While not as frequent as their cross-border operations into Pakistan, Soviet-Afghan forces have reportedly crossed into Iran on hot pursuit missions. With only skeletal garrison forces and gendarmarie along its eastern border, and because of its ongoing war with Iraq, Iran desires to avoid a major confrontation along the Afghan border.

The Iran-Iraq war continues to produce tensions along the Persian Gulf littoral. Politically, the war has somewhat polarized the Arab states with two (Libya and Syria) supporting Iran, and the others supporting Iraq in varying degrees. An Iraqi victory could re-establish the pre-war status quo, and inhibit the spread of Iran's radical fundamentalist Islamic revolution. Victory for Iran would almost certainly lead to further instability among Gulf states and could lead to the fall of Iraq's Saddam Hussayn. Presently, however, the war appears to be stalemated and a lower intensity war of attrition is likely to drag on for the foreseeable future.

Probably the most immediate threat facing the Persian Gulf states today is subversive activity, sponsored and encouraged by Iran, which has affected the Persian Gulf states in varying degrees. The attempted overthrow of the Bahrain government in January 1981, for example, was linked to a Shiite group trained in Iran. Additionally, the vulnerability of the Saudi oil fields, where Shiite Muslims are concentrated, is another concern. Major Saudi facilities are only 14 minutes flying time (F-4) from Iranian airfields. In general, the prospect for stability in the Gulf region revolves around Saudi Arabian leadership. In addition to its pre-eminent position in OPEC, Saudi Arabia has a strong influence throughout the region, in general, and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in particular.

Jordan is one of the few nations in the region with a relatively stable government and economy. As long as King Hussein continues to conform to a

general pan-Arab position on the Middle East, there is little reason to suspect a serious challenge to his rule. Additionally, despite the Jordanian purchase of Soviet weapons (air defense system), Jordan is expected to maintain its pro-Western orientation and to cooperate in areas where vital Jordanian - US interests coincide.

On the southern end of the Arabian Peninsula, another concern is the relationship between Oman and its Arab neighbors. Oman is particularly friendly to the US, this is in spite of criticism from fellow Arabs for allowing "superpower" presence in the region and supporting Egypt. Both are contrary to stated Arab policy. However, there is evidence that Oman's neighbors are privately less critical, and may even support Omani - US relations.

The primary external threat to Oman is the nearly defunct Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman (PFLO) supported by the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen. Following their defeat in 1975, less than 40 PFLO guerrillas remain at-large, but essentially inactive, in Dhofar province. The stability of Oman is more critical when taken in the context of its strategic position on the Strait of Hormuz.

Another strategic passageway, the Bab el Mandeb, is threatened by several on-going conflicts. In North Yemen, the National Democratic Front (NDF), backed and supplied by the PDY, is waging an insurgency against the Sana Government. In May 82, North Yemen launched an offensive against the NDF which substantially reduced its capabilities.

In addition, the PDY has often threatened to increase its presence on Perim Island and close the Strait. The successful closing of this Strait would essentially negate the use of the Suez Canal.

Across the Strait, on the Horn of Africa, Somalia and Ethiopia are involved in what essentially amounts to a boundary dispute. It is intensified by President Siad's stated goal of creating a "greater Somalia" which would include sections of Ethiopia, Djibouti and Kenya. Anti-Siad dissident groups continue to conduct raids into Somalia with the backing of Ethiopian President Mengistu.

Internally, Mengistu's problems with the Eritrean separatists in the northeast have been on-going for almost 25 years. The goal of the Eritreans is to establish an independent Eritrea. Eritrean insurgents seeking refuge in, and mounting operations from Sudan, have worsened Ethiopian relations with Sudan. The thousands of disenfranchised Ethiopians living under squalid conditions in Sudan exacerbates the situation.

Additionally, Libyan trained dissidents have been used to carry out subversive activity designed to cause the fall of Sudanese President Nimeri. Libyan subversive activities such as those against Chad are a continuing worry to states in the area.

A final concern in northeast Africa centers on the tri-partite alliance

among Libya, Ethiopia and the PDRY. Although the particulars of the alliance are not known, it is in part a regional security pact including military, economic and political support. The unity of the tri-partite pact, however, seems to be weakening. Bright Star 82 caused a great deal of anti-US rhetoric from the three member countries, and the Jade Tiger exercise received similar attention. It is unlikely, however, that the members will be able to present the united position they did a year ago.

Generally, near-term prospects for continued stability in the region are positive. President Mubarak has established his credibility as a sound leader which has increased stability in Egypt. In Sudan, President Nimeiri, even with economic problems, remains in power and has ensured a large degree of stability.

Another factor which must be considered is the effect of the Soviet Union. Anarchy in Iran could create an atmosphere for increased Soviet aggressiveness. The Soviets' current regional presence and basing structure have been well planned. They have basing and over-flight rights throughout the region, including South Yemen's Aden and Socotra Island, Ethiopia's Dahlak Island, and they are attempting to negotiate for rights to Diego Suarez in Madagascar. There is recent evidence that the Soviets may also be increasing their efforts to gain basing rights in the Seychelles.

We expect the Soviets to continue their efforts toward expansion. They would likely denounce any US supported initiatives or peace plans for the area as they did the Camp David Accords.

In summary, the challenge for the United States is to maintain regional stability. Successful accomplishment of the USCENCOM mission will continue to be complicated by the historical roots of conflict throughout the region, the destabilizing influences of intra-regional meddling, and Soviet activities in the area.

I. Oil.

US defense planning in the last year of the Carter Administration and at the outset of the Reagan Administration focused on a set of new and urgent requirements. These requirements derive in substantial part from the perceived threats to Western interests in the Persian Gulf region resulting from the revolution in Iran and the Iranian hostage crisis, the Iran-Iraq war, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

The combination of these events led President Carter to assert, in his State of the Union address to a joint session of Congress on January 23, 1980, that an "attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States." He added that "such an assault will be repelled by use of any means necessary, including military force."

The Reagan Administration has reiterated the Carter Administration's commitment to block aggression in the Persian Gulf region while intensifying

military planning to enforce the doctrine.

Why is the Persian Gulf region vital to American security interests? The commitment to block Soviet aggression in the Persian Gulf region is consistent with the global US objective of preventing the spread of Soviet power. But it is clear that what makes the Persian Gulf a special case is the oil that flows from the region to the United States, Western Europe, and Japan -- oil which is an important factor in the Western economic system. The primary precept on which the Persian Gulf commitment is based is that Western loss of access to Persian Gulf oil, particularly if combined with Soviet control of that oil, would be intolerable for the Western nations.

The end of World War II saw the beginning of an era of industrialization and rebuilding that has been unsurpassed. The demand for energy grew in proportion to the demand for goods and services which the depression and the subsequent war had kept from the market. Concurrently, reconstruction of the major economies of Europe and Asia fed this economic resurrection. The oil potential of the Persian Gulf was developed to meet the energy needs of the Western World and Japan. Although initial production was low, less than two million barrels per day (MBD) in 1950, oil production surpassed that of the United States by 1965 and in 1979 reached a peak of 21.4 MBD.

This rebirth of Western and Japanese industrialization, the rebuilding of war devastated economies and an emerging pattern of economic growth in many Third World nations increased the demand for oil as a primary energy source. Oil companies responding to this burgeoning demand, financed major exploration efforts that quickly established the Persian Gulf as an area of vast reserves. These reserves could be tapped and controlled since the countries owning these resources willingly permitted Western technology and expertise to lead the way. It was not until the early 1950's that the national governments of the Persian Gulf began to recognize the wealth to be gained by control of oil production. As a result, a nationalistic trend within the region began. By the mid-1970's almost all oil production was owned or controlled by the exporting nations; however, day-to-day operations continued to remain with the oil companies. Thus, the genesis of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) took seed and became a reality in 1960. From this point on, the economies of the world would grow, but the price of their growth would be directly influenced by the price paid for energy.

After the formation of OPEC, world economic growth continued for over a decade with the price of energy remaining relatively stable, but events of 1973 and 1974, resulting from the Arab-Israeli War, vividly demonstrated how dependent the world had become on oil. This first major disruption of oil supplies from the Persian Gulf resulted from the region's oil producers using the only weapon available to them, the selective cutoff of oil to the Free World. This act began a recessionary slide that would affect Western economies for a decade and would increase the national and personal wealth of Persian Gulf oil producers enormously.

Since the period of peak imports of Persian Gulf oil in 1978 and 1979, US dependency has declined significantly. This reduced dependency results from a

number of factors, including conservation, increased oil production by other major producers and a sluggish world and US economy. On the surface, present reduced US demand for Persian Glf oil tends to suggest that access to this oil is no longer vital to our national interests. However, this vision fades in the light of the realities of the world economic picture.

Crude oil remains the world's primary source of energy production. As the present world recession draws to a close, Free World economic growth will accelerate, which will increase world dependency on oil as a primary energy source for the foreseeable future.

Expected growth in world economies will place oil in a limited resource category as oil is consumed at increased rates and known reserves are depleted. Presently, the US depends upon the Persian Gulf for approximately five percent of its oil needs. Western Europe and Japan import over 40 and 69 percent, respectively, of their oil requirements from the Persian Gulf. Other less developed countries (LDC) vary in degrees of dependence ranging from 2 to 100 percent. Known world proven reserves total some 670.2 billion barrels and are distributed as follows:

- Persian Gulf	367.5 billion	54.8%
- Western Hemisphere	115.2 billion	17.4%
- Communist Bloc	85.1 billion	12.6%
- Africa	59.3 billion	8.8%
- Western Europe	23.2 billion	3.5%
- Asia-Pacific	19.7 billion	2.9%

Various studies on the impact of a loss of Persian Gulf oil have arrived at the following conclusions:

- Oil is presently, and will remain for the foreseeable future, the world's primary energy source. The availability of oil to the Western World, including the United States, is a long-term energy dependence issue which must not be viewed on a short-term basis.
- Oil is a limited resource world-wide. Increased economic growth will further increase the Free World's need for oil.
- The United States is dependent upon the Persian Gulf for approximately five percent of crude oil import requirements.
- Western Europe is dependent upon the Persian Gulf for approximately forty percent of crude oil import requirements.
- Japan is dependent upon the Persian Gulf for approximately sixty-nine percent of crude oil import requirements.
- Any disruption in Persian Gulf oil assets will cause significant impacts on Western economies ranging from moderate increases in unemployment, rates of inflation and small decreases in total GNP to a near collapse of the Free World economic structure (depending on the degree of oil disruption).

- Any disruption would impact on each nation somewhat differently, but because of the intermingling of nations in the world trade markets, the collective impact, over time, would affect each nation. Effective combating of any disruption would have to be accomplished through collective international efforts.

- Improvements in world economic markets, individual country future growth and a forecasted increase in consumption of oil will effectively increase the importance of the Persian Gulf to the US, Western Europe and the remainder of the Free World.

- Passive conservation efforts in the United States encouraged by the 1973-1974 Arab Oil Boycott have been nearly maximized. Long-term capital intensive measures are required to substantially reduce oil consumption through conservation measures.

- Alternative sources of energy are costly and, under current conditions, provide little financial incentive for private investment. In times of oil disruption/denial these sources could prove economically viable.

- The Western World remains critically dependent upon Persian Gulf oil. Continued access and use of this oil is critical and remains, for the foreseeable future, vital to the national interests of the United States and its Western Allies and friends.

J. Other Resources.

To a military planner, the strategic geographical position of Africa requires little elaboration. The crucial South Atlantic, Indian Ocean and Mediterranean Sea Lanes, to say nothing of the Suez Canal, leap out in their importance. A single sobering illustration concerning African shipping routes will suffice. The African Cape shipping route is now the most crowded of the world's sea routes comprising 24,000 ships per year; 66 ships per day, every day, 365 days a year. More germane to the specifics of the United States position, the US Strategic Institute estimates that fully 60% of America's oil imports will be moved over this route in the decade of the 1980's.

Although all strategic planners would agree on the geographic importance of Africa, less appears to be known about Africa's economic significance and importance to the United States and its Allies. Speaking in October 1979 to the US House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee of Africa, the honorable Mr. Stephen J. Solarez, Chairman, had this to say of Africa's strategic economic importance to the world and the United States: "Africa is a continent of vast mineral and oil resources. According to a number of geological and mining specialists, Africa has large and varying quantities of nearly all the world's most valuable and critical minerals as well as substantial petroleum reserves. As the extent and quality of these mineral and oil reserves have been discovered and developed, America's economic dependence on them has increased substantially." In a like vein, Mr. Charles P. Eddy, former Deputy Assistant Secretary for Energy and Minerals of the Interior Department, testified before Representative Solarez's

subcommittee "...the needs of the industrial world and the great ore discoveries in Africa have combined to place African nations in a preeminent position as mineral suppliers."

Africa represents an area of economic importance to the United States in specific terms, and in the present tense. The following table lists 13 strategic mineral upon which the United States is 50% or more dependent upon from imports, and what percentage of this dependence is supplied by African nations.

<u>MATERIAL</u>	<u>% US DEPENDENT</u>	<u>% SUPPLIED BY AFRICA</u>
Antimony	53	20
Antimony Oxide	53	46
Bauxite	94	32
Chromite	91	41
Ferrochromium	91	71
Cobalt	93	55
Industrial Diamonds	100	33
Corundum	100	95
Fluorspar	84	22
Gem Stones	99	26
Manganese Ore	97	53
Ferromanganese	97	38
Platinum	87	53

Without belaboring the strategic value of each of the above minerals, it is useful to look more closely at the uses (and therefore the immense value) of a few. Although its dollar value relative to the US Gross National Product is not large, cobalt is of critical importance. There is currently no known substitute for its use in high temperature parts of jet engines and turbines, and in cutting tools. The United States has no domestic reserves. Nor do we have any reserves of chromium. It is of critical importance in stainless steel, heat-resisting alloys and plating. There is no substitute for its use in stainless steel. The chief use of manganese is in steel production, and there is currently no known substitute.

But hasn't the US been able to overcome these deficiencies via our national strategic materials stockpile? Granted, for some materials in the stockpile there is far more than what would be needed for a 3-year emergency. For others there are substantial deficits. In the case of cobalt, the stockpile goal for a 3-year war period is about 85 million pounds. At present, there are only 40 million pounds on hand. In the case of manganese, annual industrial consumption in terms of metal content is about 1.5 million tons. Private industry has average inventories of only about .75 million tons, or about a half year's supply. The US Government stockpile at the end of 1979 consisted of 2.6 million tons, a 2-year supply.

Another measure of African mineral wealth, not necessarily of direct import to the United States, but in most cases vital to our NATO Allies, Japan and other free world nations is shown below:

<u>MATERIAL</u>	<u>AFRICAN PERCENTAGE OF WORLD PRODUCTION</u>
Crude Petroleum	9%
Manganese	29%
Rare Earth	28%
Uranium	13%
Gold	62%
Copper	17%
Iron Ore	6%
Chromite	33%
Vanadium	44%
Platinum	24%

Because of its mineral resources, Africa is of vital economic as well as politico-military importance to the United States. Western Europe and Japan are even more dependent on the area for their mineral needs. Civil unrest in this area is a chronic problem and interruptions in mineral production and/or transportation are always a possibility. The expansion of Soviet and communist influence in Africa thus is especially troubling.

V. STRATEGY, MISSION AND TASKS

A. The Threat. The primary threats to the key resources of the region and the sea lines of communication to the area are local instability and the Soviet Union. To date, the Soviet Union, with the exception of Afghanistan, has not directly involved itself militarily in the region. It has preferred, in part by necessity, to exploit conflict and instability of local origin such as coups, revolution, civil war, insurgencies, rebellion, and external attack by others of the region. But, its military presence and capabilities to exercise an overt military option and hence its influence in the region is increasing.

B. The USCINCENT Mission. USCINCENT is tasked with the mission of achieving United States national policy objectives in Southwest Asia, the Persian Gulf and the Horn of Africa. United States national policy objectives in the area include assuring Western access to adequate supplies of oil; deterring Soviet aggression; preserving regional stability; and halting and, where possible, reversing the spread of Soviet influence.

C. Strategic Objective. Foremost among the strategic peacetime functional objectives is prevention. The primary emphasis is on the reduction of causes of local conflict. Implementation requirements are specific political-military and military-economic initiatives to make the local countries militarily, economically, and politically strong and stable. In addition, USCINCENT needs to lend its cooperation and assistance to other US government agencies responsible for US diplomatic and economic initiatives throughout the region. Such assistance offers significant opportunities for countering Soviet military involvement in the region by taking advantage of US economic, technological, and managerial strength. Further, political and economic relationships can often lead to military relationships.

Another peacetime objective is that of deterrence. Within this strategic functional objective are the military options of show-of-force, protection, and interposition. The significant deterrent effect that reasonably strong local forces of the regional countries have in inhibiting Soviet coercion and intervention is recognized. In addition, a coalition of strong local forces, capable and confident of operating jointly with the forces of USCINCENT can be a significant force multiplier, greatly assisting in the successful prosecution of both the peacetime and wartime strategies.

Wartime strategies that USCINCENT has to consider derive from two basic assumptions. One is a local conflict without Soviet involvement which may range from a low intensity insurgency to a mid intensity confrontation with an indigenous force. The second assumes a mid to medium-high intensity confrontation with the Soviet Union. The contributions that strong, stable local countries can make across the spectrum from counter insurgency to coalition partnership in a conflict involving Soviet forces are manifest. For the former they constitute a stabilizing force and for the latter, a much desired force multiplier.

D. Policies and Programs.

There are a variety of policies and programs through which USCENTCOM can achieve the above strategic objectives. These programs provide opportunities to prevent, preempt, deter, or reverse Soviet military influence/involvement in the region while adding a much needed force multiplier to buttress serious weaknesses in current US military capabilities.

Security assistance can support nations of the region facing internal and/or external threats which can eventually lead to conditions exploitable by the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union will likely continue to support various dissident groups against a central government when it is in its interests to do so. If provided early enough, security assistance can help prevent the eruption of insurgency or rebellion in a particular country, or help to deter a Soviet inspired escalation of the insurgent conflict and perhaps defeat the insurgency.

Security assistance can support a nation threatened by the USSR directly or by a Soviet client state. The Soviet Union tends to avoid involvement with a country that is strong in its own right.

The refusal or disinclination of the US to provide security assistance to a nation in the area may also create a vacuum into which the USSR can expand with its own military assistance program. While indiscriminate arms transfers are to be avoided, this should be considered when evaluating requests for security assistance from regional countries.

Security assistance must be only one component of a broader, comprehensive relationship between USCENTCOM and local nations and not an end in itself. The danger of becoming involved in the "reverse client syndrome" wherein support for a country may be provided beyond the point of diminishing returns must be recognized. Nevertheless, innovative military programs are to be developed to attack the problems which make Soviet military involvement feasible in the countries in the area. These programs must go beyond purely military concerns and aid in the process of nation building. USCENTCOM sponsored/assisted civic action programs in engineering, health, and other technical programs can contribute extensively to development throughout the region, and IMET programs can provide the indigenous expertise to maintain these programs long after the departure of US/USCENTCOM cadres. The capability to mount disaster relief operations should also be developed within the USCENTCOM area.

The training aspects of security assistance must be emphasized, both IMET training in CONUS and use of MTT's in the region. Such programs benefit not only local national trainees but also develop a greater appreciation for the area among the US personnel associated with the programs.

The requirement for direct military involvement by United States forces in the area is a possibility. As has been noted, USCENTCOM objectives, vis-a-vis Soviet involvement in the area, should focus on preventing the emergence of conditions which provide the USSR the opportunities for intervention.

Nevertheless, preventive efforts will not always be possible or successful. As a result, USCENTCOM must be prepared to defend US vital national interests with military force when the need arises.

Various forms of low intensity involvement are viable options in deterring covert Soviet military involvement in the area. Appropriate internal defense and development efforts can assist in resolving internal conflicts which could otherwise lead to overt Soviet aggression. USCENTCOM must be prepared to provide advisors, logistical support, and combat elements, if required, to protect vital interests in a particular country or area.

If deterrence fails, USCENTCOM must be prepared to project power to virtually any area of the region. Accordingly, USCENTCOM must:

Support actions to acquire improved strategic lift capabilities so that forces can be deployed to the area rapidly. Particularly in a deterrent interpositionary role, the power projection force must not be overly dependent on the reserves for combat support, combat service support, or strategic lift. These assets must exist within the active force structure to support and sustain the initial deployment without having to go beyond the presidential mobilization ceiling.

Insure that the power projection force is appropriately balanced among naval, air, and ground elements. The role of ground forces is important because it is more costly to deploy and less easily redeployed. This implies a firm, more lasting commitment to countering Soviet involvement and, in addition to sending a strong signal to the Soviet Union, can appreciably build confidence among the local nations.

E. Goals and Objectives. In sum, the USCENTCOM goals and objectives for the area are aimed at increasing the costs and risks to the USSR of any military intervention, and to deny them the opportunity to exploit local instability. Our objective is to strike a balance between the preventive and deterrent strategic functional objectives through development of the necessary strategic physical infrastructure, establishment of a credible US deployment capability, responsive security assistance programs, military to military relations, and orchestrated joint exercises, all designed to assure the USSR that employing military force in the region, is not, for them, a viable option.

VI. USCENCOM FORCES

The primary mission of the US Central Command is to deter Soviet aggression and to protect US interests in the region. For deterrence to be credible, we must be prepared to fight, thereby raising the cost of Soviet aggression to an unacceptable level. In support of this mission, we must be prepared to respond rapidly and with sufficient strength to an overt Soviet invasion if we are to deter or oppose a major Soviet military intervention. We believe that if we develop this capability - and go about developing it sensibly, bearing in mind other, less demanding contingencies - we will be able to use military power, if appropriate, quickly and effectively to deal with less demanding contingencies.

USCINOCENT has operational command of the US ground, air and naval forces in his area of responsibility. This applies in both peacetime and in periods of conflict. In the latter case, USCINOCENT would command and employ US forces in combat. The forces now in USCENCOM's area of responsibility are quite limited; they include the US Air Force AWACS deployed in Saudi Arabia and the five US ships that comprise the Middle East Force.

In the event of a conflict, however, USCENCOM would draw upon a pool of rapidly deployable forces, most of which are stationed in the United States. The forces available to USCENCOM are also available to other commands. USCENCOM is not the only unified command which could have a need for rapidly deployable forces, and as a result, JCS has identified some units which, either because of their character or because of their location in the United States, could be deployed abroad relatively rapidly.

These forces constitute a pool of military power from which all unified commands can draw, depending on the crisis they face. USCENCOM develops contingency plans on the assumption that certain rapidly deployable forces would be available for use in the area of responsibility. The command identifies the levels and character of the forces that would be needed to meet a range of military problems, up to and including a major Soviet military invasion of the area. But, the US does not have enough forces, nor the airlift and sealift with which to move them, to have the luxury of assigning all, or even individual components, of this force reservoir exclusively to USCINOCENT or any other unified commander. In a crisis, the decision on how much force should be deployed, where, and when, would rest with the National Command Authorities.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff assign operational command of certain units to the nation's unified commands when engaged in theater operations and they designate support responsibilities to other units. Depending on the requirements of a contingency situation, forces designated for planning will be tailored into a theater team to carry out combat objectives when necessary.

VII. PROGRAMS AND PROSPECTS

The capability to deploy and employ combat forces is essential to the ability of the United States to deter war and, if necessary, to fight - especially in the important early days of a conflict.

Current programming for the deployment of US military forces focuses primarily on the USCENTCOM area of responsibility (AOR) for two reasons:

- The stability and security of the region are vital to US national security interests, and to those of our friends and Allies; and
- Since potential USCENTCOM contingencies encompass a wide range of demanding situations, programming for that theater provides the US a capability that covers likely demands in other theaters as well.

USCENTCOM peacetime military presence in the AOR is limited primarily to a sea-based force. Therefore, we must be able to project additional forces very rapidly into this distant region and adequately sustain them in combat. Meeting these objectives will require:

- Developing mobility capabilities to deploy forces rapidly to and within the AOR over extended air and sea lines of communication (ALOCs/SLOCs) and to sustain them in combat;
- Locating, obtaining approval for, and developing land-based prepositioning sites;
- Obtaining both overflight rights and en route access from several additional countries;
- Securing lengthy ALOCs/SLOCs during the conflict to sustain combat operations;
- Obtaining access to and improving in-theater airfields and seaports;
- Obtaining host nation support agreements with countries en route to and in the AOR; and
- Improving our cargo loading and unloading capabilities to compensate for the lack of local infrastructure.

Crisis or conflict in the USCENTCOM AOR can appear in a number of various scenarios requiring different types and sizes of forces and, depending upon the situation, different force capabilities. Regardless of their size, configuration, or destination, our forces must be prepared to deploy on a "moment's notice". Our primary concerns are that:

- The forces be "streamlined" to maximize combat power early in a crisis by ensuring the units include only time-sensitive equipment and personnel;
- The equipment to be moved be appropriate to the climate and terrain of the region;
- The limited capacity of the mobility systems be used

efficiently; and

- Steps be taken to ensure the deploying forces are "rapid" (by improving their equipment and personnel preparedness as well as planning) and "ready" (by training combat and logistics support units for operations in unfamiliar and widely varying climates and terrain).

Because of the characteristics of a rapid-response scenario in general -- and deployment requirements for the USCENTCOM AOR in particular -- support forces are faced with:

- Little or no host nation support, requiring them to be able to operate independently;
- A need for access to en route and regional facilities, in peacetime as well as during crises; and
- A need to tailor support (e.g., water, medical, communications, and transportation) for unique and austere combat operations.

Probably the most pressing need facing USCENTCOM is the requirement for more lift--airlift and sealift. It is not a question of sealift or airlift, both are required. Airlift is needed to move forces to the theater on short notice, and move them within the theater once they arrive. The sealift is needed to move outsized equipment and bulk cargo and to keep the forces supplied in an extended conflict. Sealift and airlift provide the cornerstone of this nation's ability to move combat forces and fight them where they're needed.

Strategic mobility is the key to rapid deployment planning. Sealift would be the dominant means of transporting the forces and equipment after the first few weeks of a deployment. During the early days of a conflict, however, before sealift takes effect, airlift and prepositioning would be the only means of rapidly deploying and sustaining combat forces.

Airlift provides the "rapid" element to force deployment. USCINCENT depends upon the Air Force's C-5, C-141, and C-130 aircraft. By purchasing additional spare parts, strengthening the wings of C-5s, "stretching" C-141s and, at the same time providing the C-141s with in-flight refueling

capability, the Air Force is making its present generation of airlift aircraft more valuable to USCINCENT. The Department of Defense has proposed to procure 50 additional C-5 and 44 additional KC-10 aircraft to help reduce the near-term strategic airlift shortfall. Overall Air Force airlift capability is also being improved by adding capacity through a restructured Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) Enhancement program.

To ensure that the US can take full advantage of these rapid strategic mobility programs, on-load/off-load programs have been established to allow the use of austere ports and to provide an over-the-shore capability. These improvements will also facilitate transferring cargo from one lift mode to another (i.e., from strategic sealift and airlift to intratheater air, sea, and ground transportation systems).

Our prepositioning programs are designed to reduce the total deployment burden with a very low key but credible peacetime presence in the region. They include a mixture of efforts between those with worldwide application and those which are USCENTCOM AOR specific.

There is presently on station, a Near-Term Prepositioning Force (NTPF) of 18 chartered ships. Six of these ships carry unit equipment, medical facilities, and supplies for a heavily mechanized Marine Amphibious Brigade (MAB). The remaining ships carry common-user water and POL, as well as materiel for early arriving Army and Air Force units. The NTPF depot ships provide the capability to sustain combat operations until supplies can be shipped from the United States. Although the NTPF program, per se, will be phased out in 1986, the capability it has provided will remain. The Marine Corps equipment and supplies will become part of the third Maritime Prepositioning Ship Program task force, and the depot ships will remain on station to support Army, Air Force, and common-user requirements.

The goal of the Maritime Prepositioning Ship (MPS) program is to preposition unit equipment and supplies for three Marine Amphibious Brigades (MABs). In time of crisis, the troops and their remaining materiel (those items that could not be prepositioned) would be airlifted into theater marry-up sites to meet the MPS. The MPS, unlike the NTPF, will contain self-sustaining roll-on/roll-off ships that will be able to unload cargo quicker in austere ports or over the shore. The MPS program will allow for the deployment of additional forces to the USCENTCOM AOR earlier than if they had to use available sealift.

It is expected that the first MPS task force will be on station in late 1984 and the second in 1985. Current plans call for the NTPF MAB to be replaced by the third MPS task force in 1986. Due to the global mission of the MPS and the need for fleet security, the first and second MPS will be stationed at different locations, but where they can still meet their deployment objectives for a USCENTCOM contingency.

Access to in-theater facilities, such as airfields and debarkation ports, provides for the reception of incoming units, allows early link-up with heavy equipment arriving by sealift, provides sites to stockpile supplies for sustaining combat, and in some cases provides sites from which we can conduct combat operations.

We have reached formal agreement with several nations, and are pursuing negotiations with others, for permission to preposition materiel, to use regional facilities during crises, or to conduct routine training exercises during peacetime. In some cases, it has been necessary to improve the existing facilities and infrastructure.

The following chart shows the funding approved for military construction projects in countries where we have, or expect to gain, access; the discussion that follows provides more detail on the specific projects.

Military Construction Funding
(\$ Millions)

<u>Location</u>	<u>Appropriated</u>
Egypt	49.0*
Oman	253.7
Kenya	57.9
Somalia	54.4
Diego Garcia	507.8

* FY 84 Supplemental Request Pending

It is important to note that the US is not creating any new bases, per se, in the USCENTCOM AOR. Rather, we are improving existing host nation facilities that we might use in crises or for peacetime support of US forces in the region.

Egypt has offered to permit USCENTCOM forces access to its facilities, including the strategically located facility at Ras Banas on the Red Sea, where we are planning in cooperation with Egypt, a joint construction program to build an austere facility. The improvements will include upgrading the airfield and port facilities and a limited utilities system. Once construction is completed, access to Ras Banas in time of crisis may allow USCENTCOM to deploy forces near a potential conflict area in the AOR much sooner than having to wait to directly enter the affected country. However, apart from providing caretaker forces for US facilities and participating in routine exercises with Egyptian forces, the US will maintain no peacetime military presence in Egypt.

By agreement with the United Kingdom, the US is upgrading facilities at Diego Garcia to increase the capacity of its airfield to accommodate en route

refueling support and to enlarge the harbor to accommodate the NTPF.

Agreement has been reached with Oman permitting the US to improve selected facilities for our use, primarily during crises but also in peacetime. These planned improvements include upgrading runways, taxiways, and aprons, as well as constructing support facilities for personnel and maintenance. Omani facilities could be very important for sea control and support of naval forces.

There are relatively small but important construction projects nearing completion in Kenya and Somalia. The government of Kenya has agreed to allow US forces to use its airfield and port facilities at Mombasa. This port is useful for maintaining and refueling ships, including aircraft carriers, and offers one of the few locations in the region for crew rest and liberty. Somalia has allowed US access to its seaport and airfield at Berbera and the airfield at Mogadishu. These agreements demonstrate the success, and importance to our strategy, of our military construction program for the region.

In addition to the capability to move and site forces, the ability to communicate is a key to any military operation. C3I systems are the "central nervous system" of our military forces. Without the vital services they perform, our deployed combat forces could not function effectively. We rely on our C3I systems, for example, to provide strategic and tactical warning of an attack, and to support communications not only among our force components but between our theater commanders and the National Command Authorities (NCA) as well.

The C3I problem for USCENTCOM is more complex than for other unified commands. We must be able to operate from bases which have no in-place communications capability. Therefore, our equipment must be mobile and must be capable of deploying simultaneously with our forces. The communications equipment must have long-range capability and be protected against the harsh climate that exists in the AOR. In addition, the terrain and electromagnetic characteristics of the area often cause unpredictable radio wave propagation conditions affecting the employment of this equipment.

Theater communications will begin with single channel SATCOM and high frequency links to the NCA and, as needs dictate, expand to multiple channel satellite and terrestrial line-of-sight and tropospheric scatter systems. These systems must be augmented with fully interoperable tactical communications for use in the field.

Additionally, we need lightweight, yet rugged sensors and computers to provide for collection and rapid analysis of intelligence data. Enhanced lightweight, night all-weather collection sensors with increased range, greater resolution, and requiring minimum maintenance are required.

In Southwest Asia, the Persian Gulf and the Horn of Africa, the United States seeks to further our own national interests by assisting the peoples of the area to preserve their sovereignty, independence, and territorial

integrity against external aggression. We believe these goals are broadly shared by states of the region, and the United States seeks to work in appropriate ways with friendly governments in the area in pursuing these common goals.

The US Central Command is the military aspect of this broader policy which includes the diplomatic and economic efforts in the area. The unique military requirement of protecting US vital interests in the region requires unique people and unique talents. The US Central Command has these people and talents. We have the ability to project US forces if directed and to build upon the US presence already in the area to deter enemy aggression. US Central Command has the ability to move quickly and respond. We can direct the rapid introduction of Army, Air Force, Navy and Marine forces to execute contingency operations. As a unified command we are only about one year old, but already we have been called on to deploy forces to deter intra-regional aggression. An example is the AWACS aircraft sent to Egypt in February 1983 to protect the Sudan from a Libyan supported coup. The US Central Command remains ready to act again to ensure the accomplishment of our primary goal: deterrence.